Restructuring UK local government employment relations: pay determination and employee participation in tough times by Bach, Stephen & Stroleny, Alexandra
Restructuring UK local government employment 
relations: pay determination and employee 





Stephen Bach, Department of Management, King’s College London, Franklin-Wilkins Building, 150 
Stamford Street, London SE1 9NH, UK. Email: stephen.bach@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The Conservative-led coalition government has been committed to shrinking the state and this 
has had a major impact on local government. This article examines the consequences of 
austerity measures for staff participation and pay determination in UK local government. Local 
government has been particularly hard hit by austerity measures and this has encouraged 
employers to change terms and conditions, review forms of staff participation and cut jobs. The 
implications for the institutional resilience of systems of employment regulation and employee 
involvement in the sector are considered. 
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Introduction 
In the majority of EU countries the public sector has been severely impacted by the 
consequences of the crisis. Reforms of public service employment relations, influenced by 
‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1991), emphasized the reduction of differences 
between public and private sector employment regulation with some decentralization of 
collective bargaining accompanied by more explicit performance management. These reforms 
undoubtedly altered the institutions and practice of public sector employment relations in many 
countries, but rarely as much as proponents suggested, tending to modify rather than transform 
longstanding state traditions of public sector employment regulation (Bach and Bordogna, 
2011; Kickert, 2008). 
This picture of institutional resilience, especially in comparison to the private sector, has been 
challenged by the onset of the crisis from 2008, ushering in an age of austerity (Lodge and 
Hood, 2012). The public sector across the EU has been characterized as in ‘shock’ as 
governments have curtailed the public sector pay bill via a mixture of wage and employment 
cuts. This has strained existing systems of collective bargaining and employee participation 
(Bach and Bordogna, 2013; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). 
This article examines developments in UK local government in this era of austerity. As cuts 
are applied locally, on an authority by authority basis, the local authority is the key level for 
analysing such activity, albeit within a context shaped by national austerity policies and 
national bargaining. At individual authority level, two rival propositions can be considered. 
First, that budgetary cuts have overwhelmed any scope for reaching agreement with the 
workforce on changes in pay and conditions in the sector. If this proposition is correct we 
would expect that employers are making little recourse to local employment relations 
institutions (e.g. joint consultative committees, JCCs) and are unilaterally imposing change on 
their workforce, with no attempt to consult the workforce. Secondly, by contrast, the depth of 
cuts may encourage employers to make more use of local employment relations machinery and 
seek agreement with the workforce to adapt pay and conditions to austerity conditions. We 
would expect that employers would be reinforcing efforts to consult the workforce and to reach 
a collective agreement with recognized trade unions rather than impose change. 
This article proceeds by examining the traditional model of public sector employment 
regulation and the implications for staff participation, before examining the role of local 
government, its workforce and collective bargaining reforms. The ways in which austerity 
measures have challenged established institutions and practices of staff participation and 
developments at national and local level are examined. 
Local government: structure and workforce 
There are 353 local authorities in England but there is some variation in their structure and 
functions. There is a broad division between unitary authorities that provide all services and 
that are concentrated in London and other large Metropolitan areas and two-tier authorities – 
counties and districts – with districts providing more local services within a larger county area. 
Local authorities are elected bodies but local autonomy is constrained by central government 
rules that shape local authorities’ taxation powers and require them by law to balance their 
budgets on an annual basis. Central government provides around three-quarters of local 
authority revenue expenditure with the remainder being raised in the form of a property tax 
paid by local residents (council tax) and income generated from housing, leisure and other 
services with strict rules covering the trading activities of local authorities. 
Local authorities have responsibility for a wide range of local services of which the largest 
element (more than half of expenditure) is adult and children’s services (NAO, 2013a: 11). 
Local government also includes: environmental services; cultural and leisure services; 
highways; housing; planning; and a diminishing portfolio of directly managed schools. Local 
authorities have a statutory duty to provide key services, including social care, but services 
such as youth services are discretionary and therefore more vulnerable to budgetary cuts as 
funding from central government declines. 
The emphasis in current government policy on ‘localism’ has a hollow feel to it whilst central 
government controls around 75 per cent of revenue spending and 1335 statutory duties remain 
in place (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; NAO, 2013a: 9). Central government has continually 
intervened to control council tax increases by limiting local discretion. Consequently local 
government has been viewed as the poor relation of the public sector in terms of the lack of 
government recognition of its contribution, unfavourable public expenditure settlements and 
the extent of central government intervention. This position stems from a legacy of tense 
central-local government relations, especially during the 1980s (Laffin, 1989), and scope for 
governments to engage in blame avoidance and blame diffusion strategies (Pierson, 1994). 
The largest component of UK public sector employment is in local government. The workforce 
in its broadest sense – including groups such as teachers and fire officers – is around double 
the size of the National Health Service (NHS). If groups whose pay is negotiated separately are 
excluded (e.g. via review bodies), the core local government workforce comprises 
approximately 1.8 million staff in 2013 (1.275 million full-time employees, FTEs) (Table 2, 
below). The largest groups comprise school support staff, followed by social care staff and then 
staff employed working in leisure and cultural services (e.g. libraries) (see LGA, 2011). 
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Local government is not required to provide all services in-house and a marked shift towards 
outsourcing occurred in the 1980s as result of the Conservative government policy of 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). This policy required a wide range of council services 
to be subject to competition and resulted in job losses, extensive alterations to terms and 
conditions of employment and radical organizational restructuring (Colling, 1999). The 
presumption that services should be outsourced was modified by the Labour government’s 
policy of ‘Best Value’, but overall a substantial proportion of services remain outsourced. It is 
estimated that contracting out accounts for around half of the £187bn that the public sector 
spends on goods and services each year (NAO, 2013b). A 2013 survey of 44 councils indicated 
that 83 per cent outsourced some services, most commonly refuse and street cleaning but also 
administrative services such as HR and payroll (IDS, 2013). 
Collective bargaining and staff participation 
The term social dialogue is not widely used in a UK context, reflecting more adversarial 
employment relations traditions and a less encompassing role for trade unions and employers 
in the administration of welfare services. Nonetheless, the UK public sector has been associated 
with a ‘model employer’ tradition, comprising an institutionalized and long established system 
of collective bargaining and employee participation. In local government this tradition has been 
shaped by the specific features of the sector that has made the national system of industrial 
relations more fragile than in other parts of the public sector. This stems from the existence of 
more than 350 separate employers that have jealously guarded their right to decide on most 
employment matters locally (Kessler, 1991). 
Kessler (2005) has characterized the institutionalized approach to participation in the public 
sector in the UK as having a number of elements. First, a strong collective dimension that 
operates through a single channel of union representation with extensive collective bargaining 
coverage. Secondly, a multi-tiered system combining national collective bargaining with local, 
authority based, joint consultation committees, dealing with the implementation of the national 
agreement and local issues. This tier has become more important as NPM reforms have 
fragmented public services and devolved responsibility; a trend reinforced under conditions of 
austerity. The third component comprises an increased role for direct forms of staff 
participation. 
Local authorities are independent employers but they are voluntarily covered by national-level 
pay bargaining – the national joint council (NJC) for local government services – that decides 
on pay and core national conditions whilst providing local authorities with considerable local 
flexibility and, if they so wish, scope to opt out of national pay bargaining. Employer and trade 
union negotiating bodies comprise the Local Government Association (LGA) and the main 
local government trade unions – Unison, GMB and Unite. The LGA coordinates and lobbies 
on behalf of local government, but it is not the employer and elected councillors, representative 
of LGA membership, lead negotiations and are often referred to as the national employers. The 
LGA has to reconcile a variety of different employer interests that are influenced by party 
politics (Conservative, Liberal, Labour), type of authority (unitary, two-tier), geography 
(North, South) and locational (urban, rural) interests. This is a complex task especially as the 
LGA seeks to operate on a consensus basis. Amongst the trade unions, in contrast to other parts 
of the public sector, there are no clear demarcations in terms of recruitment by occupation, 
encouraging trade union competition for membership. Unison has the largest local government 
membership with around 700,000 members. 
Both employers and trade unions have questioned the national machinery with employers 
especially concerned about the perceived rigidity of the system. Trade unions have also 
confronted challenges to national bargaining from below, notably during periods of income 
policy in the 1970s, when white-collar trade union leaders resisted membership pressure to 
pursue decentralized collective bargaining. Pressure on national bargaining increased during 
the 1980s when policies of compulsory competitive tendering resulted in more workplace 
negotiations (Kessler, 1991). More significant was the requirement to ‘equality proof’ pay 
systems against the ongoing risk of equal pay claims by low-paid women workers 
(Lissenburgh, 1995). Ultimately these pressures resulted in local government being covered by 
one collective agreement – the National Joint Council [NJC] agreement – referred to as ‘single 
status’. This landmark 1997 agreement was designed to preserve national bargaining but 
provide local authorities with sufficient flexibility to develop their own pay and grading 
structures. Basic conditions were harmonized with the NJC agreement (the ‘Green Book’) 
including a range of core national conditions (Part 2) such as sick pay, a standard 37-hour week 
and annual leave whilst Part 3 sets out car allowances, premium and overtime payments that 
can be varied locally. Implementation of single status locally was very slow, partly because of 
the absence of additional central government funding. Consequently some authorities were 
implementing single status more than a decade after the agreement was reached. 
Despite reform of bargaining structures, approximately 15 per cent of councils (around 45), 
located in the south east of England, have opted out of national pay bargaining and determine 
their annual pay award locally. This occurred mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
response to recruitment and retention difficulties with the establishment of local pay scales 
positioned above NJC levels. In practice, prior to austerity, many of these councils applied the 
national award to their pay scales (IDS, 2012). 
The second characteristic comprises the multi-tiered nature of participation. In addition to 
national collective bargaining structures, at individual employer level, joint consultative 
committees (JCC) exist. They are established on a voluntary basis, comprising employer and 
employee representatives and, in local government, elected councillors. JCCs in the past tended 
to focus on non-pay matters such as agreeing local disciplinary and other procedures and acted 
as a forum for employers to communicate their plans and consult with local trade union 
representatives (Laffin, 1989). JCCs have been confronted with contradictory pressures. On 
the one hand, they operate in a situation in which trade union membership is declining and HR 
managers are concerned to involve the whole workforce, not only trade union members. On 
the other hand, senior management and HR strategies are centrally concerned with making 
decisions at local level and maintaining staff awareness of the challenging context faced by 
local authorities, especially in the context of a lengthy pay freeze (CIPD, 2012). 
Local authorities have revamped their JCC arrangements to focus on a smaller number of 
strategic issues, retitled them and established additional voice mechanisms. For example, 
Shropshire County Council has a JCC but also established a workforce-wide staff forum to 
assist in consultation over changes in terms and conditions. 
The third component is an increase in direct participation, increasingly geared towards 
improving service delivery and to facilitate changes in rewards, HR practice and ways of 
working. Most councils have developed dense systems of management-led employee 
involvement that may be more immediately visible to staff than traditional forms of joint 
consultation. Although not mandatory, virtually all councils use regular (annual/biannual) staff 
opinion surveys, focus groups, road-shows of senior directors, team briefings, newsletters, 
‘frequently asked questions’ on their intranets etc. This growth is evident from the 2011 WERS 
data that indicate a further increase in public sector direct communication and involvement 
whilst the presence of JCCs is in decline (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). 
This growth has occurred in a period when public sector trade union density has decreased 
from 61.2 per cent to 56.3 per cent between 2007 and 2012 (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, 2013). This trend is being reinforced by public sector job losses, 
encouraging employers to supplement single channel, union-based, participation. Birmingham 
City Council (2011: 3), the largest local authority in the UK, stated in its review of relations 
with its trade unions that it would be beneficial ‘to look at ways to extend the way it conducts 
consultation and negotiation to allow non-unionized employees the voice that many stated they 
would like’. The consequences for trade union influence have been highlighted by Unison 
(2011: 1) in a report to its 2011 conference: 
‘One of the major challenges we face in local government and the health service is the 
continuing fall in trade union density. Our credibility with employers and government as well 
as our national and local bargaining strength are at stake if we do not tackle this issue in what 
are our traditionally strong membership areas.’ 
Local government under austerity 
Conservative coalition policy 
In 2010, the Labour government was replaced by a Conservative-led coalition government 
committed to fiscal consolidation as part of its programme to shrink the state and to address 
the deficit that had increased greatly as a result of government expenditure to support the 
banking and finance sector. The coalition agreement stated that ‘deficit reduction and 
continuing to ensure economic recovery, is the most urgent issue facing Britain’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010: 15). In the 2010 spending review a target was set to reduce the deficit from 8.4 
per cent of GDP in 2009 to 0.4 per cent by 2015 with three-quarters of deficit reduction linked 
to public spending cuts of £81bn (total government expenditure in 2010–2011 was £697bn) 
(Treasury, 2010). Government departmental expenditure will fall by 18.6 per cent in real terms 
by 2017–2018, with major consequences for public sector pay and employment (IFS, 2013). 
The political ideology and underlying economic assumptions of the coalition government 
constitute important drivers of unprecedented public expenditure reductions. The starting point 
is criticism of the previous Labour government’s expansion of ‘big government’, requiring 
‘social responsibility not state control; the Big Society not big government’ (Conservative 
Party, 2010: 35). There are also, however, continuities with the Labour government’s policy of 
encouraging diverse service provision and marketization. Large-scale privatization has been 
revived with the (partial) privatization of Royal Mail and the probation service and around a 
quarter of councils are looking to further outsourcing, but outsourcing via ‘shared services’ 
with neighbouring authorities is more prevalent (RSA, 2012). 
Local government is bearing a disproportionate proportion of expenditure reductions as 
compared to higher priority services such as the NHS. The Treasury in the 2010 spending 
review indicated that central government funding to local government would fall by around 27 
per cent between 2011–2012 and 2014–2015 in real terms from £29.7bn to £22.1bn (NAO, 
2013a). Importantly these reductions were ‘front-loaded’ with the steepest reductions during 
the period 2011–2013. Additional expenditure reductions of £445m for 2014–2015 were 
unveiled in Autumn 2012 supplemented in June 2013 with additional expenditure cuts for 
2015–2016, comprising a total reduction in central government grant of in excess of 30 per 
cent. The LGA’s ‘graph of doom’ suggests that after social care and waste services are 
accounted for other services face a 90 per cent cut in expenditure, leaving them unsustainable 
and making local authorities vulnerable to legal challenges (LGA, 2012: 10). Within this bleak 
financial context there are significant variations in the circumstances of individual local 
authorities, with reductions in budgets systematically greater in more deprived local authorities, 
attributed to the removal of specific government grants that supported less affluent areas 
(Hastings et al., 2013). 
The coalition government is pursuing a policy of deinstitutionalization, whereby many of the 
institutions built up during Labour’s period of government which supported workforce 
modernization are being abolished or merged, accompanied by substantial job losses (Bach and 
Kessler, 2012). An important component of this process has been a questioning of the utility 
of national pay determination. The objective is to make public sector wages more sensitive to 
local labour market conditions, intended to lower them in lower-cost areas. This policy stems 
from the coalition government’s assertion that: ‘the overall value of the public sector reward 
package, including pension provision, has been generous in recent years’ (Treasury, 2010: 37). 
The coalition government has therefore targeted the pay bill by: pension reform, wage restraint, 
including changes to pay and conditions, and staffing reductions. 
Austerity: measures and consequences 
Public sector pensions have been portrayed as overly generous although the government’s 
pension inquiry ‘firmly rejected the claim that current public sector pensions are “gold plated”’ 
(Hutton, 2011: 26). In terms of the public sector it recommended that: pensions should be 
indexed and uprated in line with a lower (Consumer Price Index) measure of inflation; normal 
pension age should move in steps from 65 to 68; workers’ contributions should be increased 
with the highest earners facing the largest percentage increases; and schemes should switch 
from final salary based schemes to career average based schemes with accrued rights protected. 
Following industrial action across the public sector in November 2011, Hutton’s 
recommendations formed the basis of intensive negotiations and agreement between the LGA 
and local government trade unions that were accepted by Unison, GMB and Unite in 
membership ballots, indicating the scope for effective joint working on complex and 
contentious issues. An important component of the agreement was that when staff are subject 
to a non-voluntary transfer of employment (e.g. due to outsourcing) they will have the right to 
stay in the local government pension scheme, a major victory for local government trade unions 
as TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings [Protection of Employment] Regulations 2006) does not 
cover pension rights. 
In terms of wage restraint, an emergency budget in June 2010 announced a two-year wage 
freeze (2011–2013) with some protection for staff earning £21,000 or less, subsequently 
followed by two years when pay awards were limited to an average 1 per cent. The position of 
local government is distinctive. In central government (including the NHS) pay review bodies 
have become more important in pay determination over recent decades, providing the 
government with scope to intervene directly by accepting, modifying or rejecting pay review 
body recommendations. In local government, central government is involved indirectly in pay 
determination via its expenditure decisions and local government is therefore not within the 
remit of the government’s public sector pay policy. This has resulted in a lengthier (2010–
2013) period of pay restraint. Local government employers awarded no pay increase in 2010, 
before the coalition government decided to impose a two-year pay freeze, and declined to 
follow central government and provide a £250 pay increase for the lowest paid. Two further 
years of no pay offer followed in 2011 and 2012 with national employers stating that: ‘There 
is genuine sympathy for the position of the lower-paid but…any pay award could only be met 
through further job losses and cuts to services’ (cited in IDS, 2012). 
The LGA is in a difficult position. It is dominated by Conservative councils, of differing 
ideological hues, with some harbouring reservations about the severity of cuts. At the same 
time there is an institutional interest in maintaining its relevance as an employers’ organization 
underpinned by the national agreement, but this is difficult when national pay bargaining has 
been in abeyance for three years. Trade unions recognize that employers are seeking to amend 
core national conditions, despite considerable local flexibility. A dilemma for trade unions is 
that in the absence of sector-wide reform and with a lengthy pay freeze, the focus has been on 
local-level negotiations, usually involving unpalatable trade-offs between pay, conditions and 
employment, eroding the national agreement. 
The national employers signalled they would seek to make a pay award in 2013, in exchange 
for changes in national terms and conditions. The 2013 negotiations resulted in a 1 per cent pay 
increase, endorsed by trade union membership ballots in Unison and the GMB (but not Unite). 
The national employers, however, were ‘extremely disappointed that the unions have been 
unable to consider even the most minor elements of reform’ (LGA, 2013a). In practice, scope 
for reforms of core conditions at national level was challenging for employers as well as trade 
unions. Local variations in core national conditions, such as reductions in sick pay or annual 
leave, have been implemented by some authorities and these employers were concerned that 
they would be paying for change twice – locally and nationally. 
This impasse has encouraged a different employer approach for 2014–2015 with implications 
for the level at which change is negotiated; the substantive content of reform and the process 
by which this will be achieved. The LGA is working with local authorities to achieve change 
locally rather than nationally, with a focus on existing core national conditions such as sick 
pay, annual leave and length of the working week, leaving national negotiations to focus on 
pay. This process diminishes further the regulatory influence of the national agreement with 
the LGA effectively abandoning attempts to get reform at national level and supporting local 
change. It confirms the difficulties faced by local government trade unions in maintaining 
opposition to local negotiations on national (Part 2) core conditions. Local government trade 
unions nationally have always instructed local branches not to negotiate on these conditions 
and to register disputes. Some local authorities have removed contentious changes in sick pay 
from austerity-driven workforce packages, but many others have proceeded with them (LGA, 
2012). Substantial job losses have made the threat of employment cuts very tangible, leading 
local trade unions to consider cuts in sick pay to forestall larger employment reductions or to 
accept the suspension of incremental progression. These changes on a temporary or more 
permanent basis reinforce uncertainty about the future of national bargaining. A small majority 
(52 per cent) of local authorities expect it to continue at least in the short term, many expect 
the break-up of national bargaining or at the very least expect it to become confined to pay 
rather than conditions (IDS, 2013). 
A survey of 224 councils conducted by the LGA in December 2010 and then repeated in 
September 2011 identified a high level of local activity designed to generate short-term savings 
(LGA, 2012: 10–11 and see Grimshaw et al., 2012). Over half of local authorities had reduced 
car allowances whilst around a quarter were changing their sick pay schemes, removing 
payments for the first two or three days of absence, although this may reduce the incentive to 
return to work. Other changes being implemented included reductions in annual leave, 
premium pay rates – such as at weekends or public holidays – and overtime, unsocial hours 
payments and 17 per cent were considering the removal of increments (11 per cent had already 
removed them). This figure had increased to around 20 per cent by 2013 accompanied by 
movement towards performance-related progression pay, linked to individual appraisal or 
competencies (LGA, 2013b). Although local employers are focused on curtailing their pay 
bills, they are also aware of the need to consider recruitment and retention issues and their role 
as an employer in tackling disadvantage, encouraging many employers to become a living wage 
employer. In contrast to the statutory national minimum wage (NMW) the living wage is 
voluntary. The hourly rate is set at a higher level than the minimum wage and is calculated to 
reflect the basic cost of living in the UK. The 2013 London Living wage is £8.80 (£7.65 outside 
London) compared to the adult NMW rate of £6.31. 
Staff participation in changes to pay and conditions 
In terms of the process of reform, around 27 per cent of local authorities stated that changes 
were being considered by trade unions, 37 per cent had not shared their plans with the unions, 
23 per cent had reached agreement with them (although this was often linked to single status 
rather than budget cuts) and 4 per cent had imposed change or planned to do so (LGA, 2012). 
Although the percentage imposing change is small, this figure does not include employers that 
have used the threat of unilateral cuts in terms and conditions to gain agreement. Although not 
common, high-profile cases signal to the local government workforce that unilateral change is 
not a hollow threat. Section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992 allows employers to give notice and lawfully dismiss workers and re-engage them on new 
contracts with different terms and conditions, provided attempts have been made to reach 
agreement and a period of consultation has occurred. In this context staff are under considerable 
duress to agree to the new contract to prevent dismissal. 
For trade unions and their members this represents a difficult situation because the inability to 
prevent unilateral imposition – if staff are dismissed and re-engaged – indicates a limited 
capacity to influence change locally. Most local government employers have recognized the 
considerable risks to staff engagement and the detrimental effects on employment relations of 
imposing change unilaterally, using a process of dismissal and re-engagement. In several high-
profile cases, such as Southampton City Council, unilateral wage cuts provoked rolling strike 
action by different groups of workers and legal challenges. These actions did not prevent the 
imposition of new contracts in 2011 and associated wage cuts, although the employer did make 
some concessions in comparison to the original proposals. Other high-profile cases include 
Shropshire Council and Birmingham City Council. The threat of dismissal and re-engagement 
has therefore been more widely used as a negotiating strategy; putting pressure on individual 
employees to accept new terms or force the trade unions to reach a local collective agreement 
for the whole workforce. 
Take the case of Shropshire Council (established by reorganization in 2009), a Conservative-
controlled unitary council, with a workforce of almost 8000 FTEs of which around 35 per cent 
are Unison members. It set a savings target of £76m to be achieved by 2013/14. During 2010/11 
proposals were outlined to change terms and conditions that the council argued would save 
around £7m and safeguard 400 jobs. The proposals included a pay reduction for all staff of 5.4 
per cent but with partial exemption for the lowest paid, retention of market supplements for 
hard to recruit groups, and changes to sick pay and car mileage allowances. The council 
proceeded with its threat to dismiss and re-engage staff as no collective agreement was agreed, 
despite protests and Unison members taking 24-hour strike action. The planned 5.4 per cent 
pay reduction was phased over two years with a pay cut of 2.7 per cent implemented from 
October 2011. The proposed 2.7 per cent cut from October 2012 was reduced for most staff to 
1.7 per cent following consultations with trade unions and the workforce. In addition, during 
2011 the Council removed payment for the first three days that staff were sick, but in November 
2012 reversed this policy agreeing to work with trade unions to reduce absenteeism. The 
process blended coercion and consultation with trade unions and the wider workforce. Pay cuts, 
however, have not prevented employment reductions and in 2013 Shropshire Council 
announced plans to make 1700 redundancies as part of moves towards halving its workforce 
by 2015 to address funding reductions and to shift towards a commissioning-led authority 
(BBC, 2011a and b; Shropshire Council, 2011; Shropshire Star, 2013). Job losses have 
deepened since 2010–2011 (see Table 1). 
Even in very inauspicious circumstances local trade unions have played a significant role in 
modifying employer proposals, suggesting that trade unions still have some capacity to 
recalibrate employer strategies. Trade union capacity to mobilize, however, is constrained by 
existing legal constraints and fear of job loss as well as often low turnouts and slim majorities 
in ballots for industrial action. A further threat arises from the coalition government 
encouraging local authorities to reduce paid time that staff representatives are granted to 
undertake trade union activities. It remains uncertain, however, if there is much appetite 
amongst employers to antagonize further the workforce in a period of rapid change. As the 
LGA points out in advice to its members ‘reasonable facilities are important. There is 
considerable value in coherent and timely trade union input in dealing with significant 
organizational change and when terms and conditions are being re-negotiated’ (LGA, 2013b: 
10). 
Employment reductions 
The most significant response to austerity has taken the form of employment cuts. In contrast 
to the ‘sovereign employer’ tradition, there is no separate public sector employment statute in 
the UK, placing relatively few constraints on collective dismissals as long as appropriate 
consultation procedures are followed, including attempts to minimize redundancies. Individual 
employment protection has been reduced further because the coalition increased the qualifying 
period for protection from unfair dismissal from one to two years and introduced fees for 
tribunal hearings. The scale of workforce reductions in a short time period is unprecedented. 
The Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) initially predicted in June 2010 that public sector 
employment would decline by 490,000 jobs by 2014–2015 but this forecast has been increased 
several times and the OBR suggests that 730,000 jobs, around 13 per cent of general 
government employment, will be removed by 2016–2017 (OBR, 2012). Local government has 
been most affected by employment reductions. 
Table 2 indicates that employment reductions between 2008 and 2013 in England and Wales 
have amounted to almost 429,000 staff (295,000 FTEs), 19.3 per cent of the local government 
workforce (18.8 per cent in FTEs) – almost one in five. This decrease in FTEs is particularly 
evident since 2010, when austerity measures started in earnest. Up to early 2010 the number of 
FTEs in local government had increased, reflecting the overall growth in employment in the 
public sector as a whole under Labour (1997–2010). What these data do not indicate, however, 
is the variety of means by which these workforce reductions are being implemented. In many 
cases local authorities are combining vacancy freezes, mainly voluntary redundancies, and 
delayering with more concerted efforts to share services. At least 337 local authorities in 
England are sharing services such as HR (LGA, 2013b). In addition, services are also being 
withdrawn, more narrowly targeted or downgraded, as the case of libraries illustrates (House 
of Commons, 2013). 
The breakdown of trends by gender and employment status provides a more detailed picture 
and indicates that temporary and agency staff are often being particularly targeted given that 
employment reductions within this category amount to 22 per cent, whilst the proportional 
decrease in permanent staff is lower at 18.8 per cent. Table 2 also highlights the high proportion 
of women in the workforce with a much higher proportion of part-time as well as full-time staff 
being female. Overall, three-quarters of staff employed by local authorities are women (2010: 
75.1%) and consequently austerity measures are having a disproportionate effect on women. 
However, there do not appear to be significant gender differences in the proportion in which 
employment levels fell in local government: there has been a reduction of around 15 per cent 
for both male and female part-timers respectively, and only a slightly higher reduction in male 
full-timers of around 24.8 per cent compared to a decrease of 22.2 per cent of female full-
timers. However, in terms of total headcount, female staff, especially part-time staff, are 
bearing the brunt of job losses. 
Conclusion 
Local government has been particularly hard hit by austerity measures and the traditional model 
of employment regulation provided considerable scope for employers to alter terms and 
conditions and reduce employment in comparison to local government in many other countries 
where staff are governed by stricter legal statutes. The centrality of national collective 
bargaining and arrangements for local staff participation has not precluded vigorous debate 
about the most appropriate balance between national and local decision-making and over the 
type of issues that should be decided at local level. Consequently there has always been a 
degree of fragility in relation to the national bargaining structure, reflecting the existence of 
over 350 independent employers with diverse political and economic circumstances and 
employing a differentiated workforce. Nonetheless, despite some caveats, especially in relation 
to low-paid women workers, the model employer approach in the past provided safeguards for 
the workforce via an institutionalized system of employee participation grounded in high trade 
union density, national collective bargaining and systems of local consultation. 
Our analysis indicates that in local government the institutional embeddedness of national pay 
determination has decreased with the role of the national agreement as a mechanism that sets 
core national standards across the sector in retreat. Most local authorities continue to see value 
in some form of national pay coordination, but they have reasserted their right to decide locally 
key terms and conditions of employment, blurring the division between terms that are agreed 
locally and those that are agreed nationally. This, however, is far removed from the coalition 
government’s vision of deinstitutionalized employment relations with market-facing pay and a 
restricted role for collective, trade union-based voice. There is little evidence that more 
employers are seeking to opt out of the national agreement or to restrict the role of trade unions. 
Oxford City Council is one high-profile authority that has opted out of the national agreement 
since the start of austerity cuts, but it has not triggered further exit from the national agreement. 
In some ways the preoccupation with the national agreement and its future directs attention 
away from important developments that are occurring at local authority level. 
In relation to our two propositions, austerity has not overwhelmed the scope for trade union 
and employee participation in responding to change. At national level there are signs of such a 
trend as central government instigated unilaterally a pay freeze. Although it did not cover local 
government it set the parameters for negotiations within the sector. The pay freeze, however, 
and the scale of cuts has galvanized employers to seek local agreement for changes in terms 
and conditions and this can rarely be achieved without trade union involvement. These forms 
of concession bargaining have been very challenging for trade unions. They have increasingly 
confronted employers that have engaged in widespread face-to-face consultation with the 
whole workforce that has influenced the stance of local employers and trade unions. Local 
employers have therefore attempted to maintain workforce engagement and this has combined 
traditional representative participation via trade unions and intensive processes of 
communication, directly to staff. Consequently our second proposition that austerity measures 
have encouraged more staff participation is a more prevalent response across the local 
government sector. This participation, however, is relatively shallow and very much on terms 
set by the employer. Trade unions remain in a highly defensive concession bargaining position 
that provides little encouragement for local government trade unions as they seek to rebuild or 
at least stabilize membership losses incurred under continuing conditions of austerity. 
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